(4th tetralogy : The Soul - 2nd dialogue of trilogy)

Foreword: this page is not the translation into English of its counterpart in French. It is an html version of my translation into English of this section of the Republic directly from the Greek found in the pdf file Plato (the philosopher) : User's Guide and it doesn't include a translation of the numerous notes found in the French version. That will come later.

[504e][...]
At any rate, this, [it is] not only a few times [that] you heard [it], but now either you don’t have it present in your mind, or else you have in mind [505a] to cause me trouble by taking issue with me. But I think it’s rather the latter since, that indeed the idea of the good (hè tou agathou idea) be the most important object of learning, you heard it many times, [and that it is] that in truth through which what is just and the other [things] we take advantage of become advantageous and beneficial. And now, you probably know that I’m about to say that, and besides, that we don’t know it adequately. But if we don’t know it, even if we knew all the rest in the best possible way, but without this [idea], you know there would be no benefit for us, as there is none if [505b] we possess something without the good. Or do you think it in any way fulfilling to possess all possessions, but [that they] not [be] good? Or to conceive everything else but the good, and to conceive nothing fine and good?
By Zeus, not me at least, he said.
But of course, this also you certainly know: that, on the one hand, for the many, pleasure seems to be the good, while for more refined ones, [it’s] judgment/intelligence.
How [could] not [that be the case]?
And moreover, my friend, that those who so think are unable to indicate judgment / intelligence of what, but are forced in the end to say [it’s] that of the good.
And, he said, in a most ridiculous manner.
[505c] How indeed [would] not [that be the case], said I, when, reproaching us indeed that we don’t know the good, they talk to us as [persons] knowing [it]? For they say it to be judgment / intelligence of the good, as if this time we understood what they say when they utter the name of the good.
Most true, he said.
But what about those defining the pleasure good? Could it be that they are in a way full of a lesser error than the others?... Or aren’t they too forced to agree that there are bad pleasures?
Most certainly!
It thus happens to them, I believe, that they agree that the same things are both good and bad, isn’t it?
[505d] Of course!
Isn’t it clear then that [there are] huge and numerous disputes about it?
How indeed couldn’t it be the case?!
But then, [is] not this obvious: regarding just and fine [things / activities / possessions / attitudes / statements /...] many would choose those which seem so even if they are not to nonetheless do and possess and look like them, while regarding good [things / possessions], nobody would be satisfied with possessing those that seem so, but they look for those that are [so], for opinion in such cases, everybody holds worthless.
Very much so, he said.
So, that which every soul pursues and for the sake of which [505e] it does all [things], auguring it to be something, but being at a loss and unable to grasp appropriately what in the world it is nor possess a stable belief about it as about other [things], and for this very reason unable to determine about other [things] if it is something beneficial, about something of such quality and weight [506a], shall we say that they too must in the same manner stay in the dark, those [who are] the best in the city, in the hands of whom we will entrust everything?
Not the least indeed, he said.
I think at any rate, I said, that just and fine [things] whose manner of being one way or another good is unknown would possess a guardian of not much worth in one ignoring that about them; and I presage that nobody before these will know them adequately.
You presage damn well, he said.
Would not then our constitution be perfectly put in order if [506b] such a guardian oversees it, the one knowing those [things]?
Necessarily, he said. But then you, Socrates, [tell us] whether you say knowledge to be the good, or pleasure, or still something else besides these?
What a man! said I. Fair enough, you made long obvious that, as far as you are concerned, you wouldn’t be satisfied with what the others think about it!
Indeed, he said, Socrates, it doesn’t seem right to me either to be willing to state the opinions of the others, but not his own, after so much [506c] time spent laboring on such matters.
But then, said I, does it seem to you to be right, on matters one doesn’t know, to speak as if knowing?
Not the least, of course, he said, as knowing, but at least, as having an opinion, to be willing to say what one believes.
But then, I said, have you not perceived opinions without knowledge as all base, the best among them [being] blind? Or do they seem in any way to differ from blind persons walking straight on a road those holding some true opinion without intelligence?
Not at all, he said.
Then, do you want to contemplate base, blind and crooked [things] when it is possible [506d] to hear from others bright and fine ones?
Don’t, for Zeus sake, Socrates, said Glaucon, withdraw as if you were at the end! For it will be good enough for us that, in the same way you elaborated on justice and moderation and the others, you elaborate similarly also on the good.
For me too indeed, said I, my dear fellow, it would be even better. But as I might not be able [to do it], though displaying zeal, disgracing myself I would bring laughter upon me. But, blessed ones, what on earth [506e] the good itself might be, let it be so for the time being, for it seems to me to require more than the present impulse to come upon my present opinion on it. But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most similar to it, I’m willing to talk, if it’s agreeable to you too, and if not, drop [the whole thing].
Then speak, he said. And some other day, you will pay back the tale of the father.
[507a] I wish we were able, I said, me to deliver and you to receive it and not merely as now the yield. But for the time being, this yield and offspring of the good itself, receive [it]. Yet beware lest I somehow deceive you by giving you involuntarily a false account of the yield.
We’ll beware, he said, to the best of our ability. But only speak!
Not before coming to a complete agreement [with you], said I, and reminding you of those things that have been said earlier and had been said often on other occasions.
[507b] Which ones? Said he.
We say of many ***s [things / activities / possessions / attitudes / statements /...] that they are beautiful, said I, and of many ***s [that they are] good and similarly in each case and we distinguish them through speech.
We say so indeed.
And then, beautiful itself and good itself and similarly for all the ***s we posited earlier as many, positing them anew according to one single idea of each one as being one, we call each one what it is.
It is so.
And then we say the ones are seen, but not grasped by thought, while ideas on the contrary are grasped by thought, but not seen.
Quite so indeed.
[507c] Then, with what [part] of ourselves do we see those [that are] seen?
With sight, he said.
And then, said I, with hearing those [that are] heard and with the other senses all the sensible?
Yes indeed.
But then, said I, did you give much thought to the extent to which the maker of the senses has put the greatest expenditure in making the power of seeing and being seen?
Not much, he said.
Then, look at it this way. Is there something else of another kind required by hearing and sound for the one to hear, the other to be heard, such that [507d] if the third one is not present, the one will not hear and the other will not be heard?
Nothing, he said.
I think anyway, said I, that not most of the others, not to say none of them, do require anything of the kind. Or do you have something to say?
Not I, said he.
But that of sight and of the visible, aren’t you conscious it is in such need?
How?
Sight being one way or another in the eyes and the one having it being intent on using it, and a colored envelope being present in their neighborhood, if [507e] a third kind doesn’t come along, peculiar by nature to this very [situation], you know that sight will see nothing and colors will be invisible.
What are you talking about, he said, thus?
What you indeed call, said I, light!
True, he said, [what] you say!
[It is] thus by no small idea [that] the sense [making us able] to see and the power to be seen [508a] have been yoked together by a more valued yoke than [the one used for] the other [senses and powers] yoked together, if light is not without value.
But for sure, he said, it is far from being without value!
Then, which one of the gods in heaven do you hold responsible for this, lord whose light makes sight able to see as best as possible and the visible [things] to be seen?
The very [same] one as you, he said, and the others, for the sun [is] obvioiusly what you ask.
Is not, then, this by nature the relation between sight and that god?
How?
The sun is neither sight itself not that in which it occurs, which [508b] indeed we call “eye”.
No indeed.
But it is the most conformed to the sun, I think, among the organs of senses.
By far!
And then, the power it has, doesn’t it possess [it] as dispensed from this one like something overflowing?
Of course yes!
And isn’t it [true] also that the sun is not sight, yet, as responsible for it, it is seen by [sight] itself?
So it is, said he.
This, then, said I, is what I meant when talking of the offspring of the good, that the good engendered analogous to itself, what indeed itself [508c] [is] in the intelligible domain with regard to intelligence and what is perceived by intelligence, this one [being] in the visible with regard to sight and what is seen.
How? He said. Tell me more about it.
Eyes, said I, you know that when one no longer turns them toward those [things] the colored envelope of which daylight may reach, but [toward] those under nocturnal light, they see dimly and seem almost blind as if they no longer had clear sight in them.
Absolutely, he said.
[508d] But when on the other hand, methinks, [it’s toward] those the sun lights from above, they see clearly and it appears that those same eyes have it in them.
Yes indeed.
So now, the [case] of the soul, conceive [it] this way: when what truth lights from above and that which is, it relies upon this, it conceives and gets to know this and appears to have intelligence; but when it’s upon what is diluted in darkness, what becomes and perishes, it produces opinions and sees dimly, turning those opinions up and down and then it seems not to have intelligence.
Indeed it seems so.
[508e] Thus, that which provides the truth to what is capable of being known and, to those who get to know, such power, you must say that it is the idea of the good, and conceive it (the idea of the good, feminine in Greek), as capable of being known, as being responsible for knowledge (epistèmè) and truth, but, beautiful as they both may be, getting to know (gnôsis) and truth, believing it (the good, neuter in Greek) different and still more beautiful than them, you’ll be right in your belief; besides, knowledge (epistèmè) [509a] and truth, in the same way as there, to consider light and sight as conformed to the sun [is] right, but to believe [them] the sun cannot be held rightly, similarly too here, to consider both of them (knowledge and truth) conformed to the good [is] right, but to suppose either one of them [to be the] good [is] not right, but we must consider of even greater value the possession of the good.
[It is] an extraordinary beauty, he said, you are talking about, if it produces knowledge and truth, and yet is itself more beautiful than them; for you at least, no doubt, don’t define it as pleasure!
Watch your words! Said I. But examine this resemblance of it still further in this way.
[509b] How?
The sun, to ***s seen, [it’s] not only, I guess, the power to be seen [that] you’ll say it brings, but also generation and growth and nurture, though not being itself generation.
Yes indeed.
And now, in what’s capable of being known, [it’s] not only the fact of being known, should we say, [which] is present under the effect of the good, but the [fact of] being (intelligible) (to einai) and the ousia (11) are also added to them under its effect, [under the effect] of the good which is not ousia but still beyond ousia, standing above them owing to its seniority and power.
[509c] And Glaucon, most laughably: Apollo! He said, what a divine hyperbole!
But you, said I, are responsible, forcing me to state my opinions about it.

(to next section : The Analogy of the Line)

(1) For a few comments of what I am attempting to achieve in my translations, see the page listing the translated excerpts of the Republic.
Words between brackets in the translation are words which are not in the Greek text but that I have added to make the translation a little more understandable. I include within parentheses after an English word the Greek word it translates when I refer to it in my commentary. I have left a few key words (logos, ousia, dialegesthai, dialektikè) untranslated because I thought translating them would do more harm than good. When that is the case, they are clickable toward their entry in the Lexicon of Greek words important for understanding Plato available on this site. (<==)